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NOTES

but they could not attack the separate estate of the wife12 and
the family would preserve at least part of its economic resources.
It is then submitted that while the community property system is out of "balance" as to the recovery of damages arising from
personal injury actions, the supreme court by its decision in
Houghton v Hall1" has preserved the "balance" with regard to
earnings arising from the separate business, trade, occupation, or
industry of the spouses.
R. R. A.

CRIMINAL
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STATUTE-STATUS

OF FOREIN CONVICTIONs-Defendant was convicted of a felony.
He was later charged by information as being a second offender,
the prior crime having been petty larceny in the sum of $100 in
the state of New York. That offense was a misdemeanor by the
laws of New York, but it would have been a felony if it had been
committed in Louisiana. Defendant then filed a motion to quash
the indictment on the grounds that the habitual offender statute'
was not applicable to his case. Held, that the word "crime" used
in the Louisiana habitual offender statute should be interpreted
to mean a felony and not to include a misdemeanor. Hence, the
prior offense must have been a felony by the laws of the particular state in which it was committed in order to hold the accused
as a multiple offender. Since the defendant was convicted of a
misdemeanor in New York, the habitual offender statute is inapplicable and the motion to quash is sustained. State v. Johnson,
13 So. (2d) 268 (La. 1943).
One of the most difficult problems in administering the habitual criminal statutes has been to determine what effect should
be given convictions in foreign states. 2 There are two views: the
12. The community property is liable for the separate debts of the husband whether such debts were contracted either before or after the creation
of the community. Glenn v. Elam, 3 La. Ann. 611 (1848); Davis v. Compton, 13
La. Ann. 396 (1858); Hawley v. Crescent City Bank, 26 La. Ann. 230 (1874);
Succession of Moore, 42 La. Ann. 332, 7 So. 561 (1890). On the other hand, the
community is not liable for the debts of the wife which are clearly her own,
whether such debts were contractbd before marriage or afterwards. Flogny v.
Hatch, 12 Mart.(O.S.) 82 (La. 1822); Kennedy v. Bossiere, 16 La. Ann. 445
(1862); Jones v. Read, 1 La. Ann. 200 (1846). See Daggett, The Community
Property System of Louisiana (1931) 48-51.
13. 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933).

1. La. Act 15 of 1928, repealed and re-enacted by La. Act 45 of 1942 [Dart's
Crim. Stats. (1943) § 709].

2. The problem is ably discussed in Comment (1939)
REviEw 177.-
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external and the limited internal.- The external view, which is
followed by the majority of the states with habitual criminal
legislation, 4 evaluates foreign convictions according to the law
of the sister state. The limited internal view considers the foreign
conviction in the light of local policy; in other words, it compares
the conviction with local law and determines the effect therefrom.
Louisiana has heretofore followed the limited internal view.
Another recent Louisiana case, State v. Vaccaro,5 firmly established the criteria that to fall under the multiple offender law
the former conviction in the foreign state must be for such an
act as would have been a felony by Louisiana law had it been
committed in this state. Construing the Vaccaro case and the
principal case together, it is apparent that a double standard has
been imposed-the prior offense must be both a felony under the
Louisiana statutes and a felony under the laws of the foreign
state. This is a unique position in American jurisprudence, but not
necessarily incongruous.6
The Louisiana Supreme Court based its decision in the principal case upon the definition of the word "crime." The proper
definition is the crux of the matter, for the statute reads "any
person who. . ., after having been convicted under the laws of
any other state. . . of a crime which, if committed within this
state, would be a felony."' Thus the word "crime" in the statute
must be first defined. Then it must be decided whether the foreign
conviction is a "crime," by using the definition, before the offense
can be tested as to whether it is a felony under Louisiana law. If
it is not a "crime" then necessarily it cannot be considered a prior
conviction.
The Louisiana Supreme Court bases its holding that "crime"
is synonymous with "felony" and cannot include a misdemeanor
upon two grounds. First, the word "crime" has never been precisely defined in Louisiana; and, secondly, the pertinent statutes
themselves must be read and a meaning assigned that is consistent with the intent of the statute-'
3. A third view, the strict internal, has been omitted because it gives no
effect to foreign convictions. A small minority follows this view. Ga. Code
Ann. (Park, et al., 1936) tit. 27, § 2511; Minn. Stats. (Mason, 1927) § 10157.
4. See Comment (1939) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 177 for a complete enumeration.
5. 200 La. 475, 8 So. (2d) 299 (1942). Also discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1941-1942 Term (1943) 5 LoUISIANA LAW REViEw 193, 258.
6. In examining the jurisprudence of states following the limited internal view, no case was found which presented a similar question.
7. La. Act 15 of 1928.
8 Ibid.
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Although the term "crime" has never been specifically defined
in this state as including both felonies and misdemeanors, the inference is unmistakable. State v. Dickerson9 adequately stated,
"'A crime is an act or omission which is prohibited by law as injurious to the public and punished by the state.'"' In accord is
State v. Bischoff" which says, "a crime may be defined to be an
act or conduct for the commission of which a penalty is denounced by statute." It seems strange that the court could disregard
1 2'
these substantial definitions of the word "crime.'
Mr. Justice Ponder analyzes the language of the habitual offender statute very carefully and concludes that the legislature
must have intended to limit the word "crime" to felonies. Various
phrases are used in the statute, such as "such second offense,"
"subsequent felony," and "upon a third conviction for a felony,"
which, the court explains, cannot refer other than to a prior
conviction for a felony under the laws of the foreign state. Nevertheless, if the court limits itself to construction of the language
of the statute, the legislative intent would appear otherwise. The
limited internal test is clearly laid down by the requirement that
the crime must be one which "if committed in this state, would
be a felony."' The language which follows in the statute naturally
refers to a prior felony according to our Louisiana law, and not
the law of the state of the crime.
However, the act 4 which provides for the proof of the foreign
conviction stipulates that certificates from the chief officer of any
state prison or penitentiary are prima facie evidence of the conviction. It contains no provision for the proving of a misdemeanor
conviction. Thus, it appears that the foreign conviction must be
for a felony in order for the district attorney to be able to present
the necessary proof.
This practical consideration may have played a controlling
role in the court's conclusion that the foreign conviction must be
for an offense which was a felony by the law of the state in which
B. N. H.
the crime was committed.
9. 139 La. 147, 152, 71 So. 347, 349 (1916).
10. An almost identical definition is given in State v. Heuchert, 42 La.
Ann. 270, 7 So. 329 (1890).
11. 146 La. 748, 779, 84 So. 41, 52 (1920).
12. Art. 7, La. Crim. Code of 1942, which was passed subsequent to this
decision, reads: "A crime is that conduct which is defined as criminal in this
Code, or in other acts of the legislature, or in the constitution of this state."
13. La. Act 15 of 1928.
14. La. Act 16 of 1928 was enacted at the same time as the original habitual offender statute, La. Act 15 of 1928.

